Faces of Impunity: Profiles of 2025 Sham Election Candidates with Alleged Criminal and Repressive Backgrounds

Ex-Military and Security Figures Tied to Repression

Several candidates come directly from the heart of Myanmar’s security apparatus, bringing with them allegations of involvement in serious abuses and repression.

1. U Lin Zaw Tun (USDP, Minephyu Township, Pyithu Hluttaw candidate)
   A retired major, Lin Zaw Tun is standing for the Union Solidarity and Development Party. Available information links him to the assassination of U Ko Ni, the prominent legal adviser to the NLD, alongside former officers Zeyar Phyo and Aung Win Khaing. Despite these allegations, he has never faced accountability. He also maintains close relations with the Minephyu–Nangyun People’s Militia, and has long been regarded as a local power broker. During the 2020 election, people’s militias reportedly transported voters to support the USDP; when NLD candidate U S. Mar Gam filed an official complaint about this, he was later shot dead, a case that was quietly closed without identifying the perpetrators.
2. U Han Min Win (People’s Party, PR candidate for Amyotha Hluttaw)
   A Defence Services Academy graduate (52nd Intake) and former colonel in the Signals Corps, Han Min Win was involved in repression operations in Pyinmana after the coup, including cutting Wi-Fi lines and disabling CCTV – actions that undermined communication and documentation of abuses. Around 2022, following a complaint by his wife under the Monogamy Law, he was sentenced by a military court to five years’ imprisonment for breaching military discipline. In Yamethin Prison, he is alleged to have acted as an informant, writing reports on other political prisoners and passing information to the authorities. Despite the five-year sentence, he was released in 2023 and is now contesting in the 2025 election.
3. U Min Min Tun (People’s Pioneer Party, Hpyar Pon Pyithu Hluttaw candidate)
   Having joined the Tatmadaw in 1996 and transferred to military intelligence in 2000, Min Min Tun left the army in 2004. He now serves as the General Secretary of the People’s Pioneer Party and will stand as a candidate in Hpyar Pon Township. His trajectory from military intelligence into party leadership illustrates the revolving door between security institutions and electoral politics under the current system.
4. U Taint Saung (Kachin State Minister for Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation; NDA-K background)
   A former commander in the Kachin New Democracy Army (NDA-K), Taint Saung has been a key negotiator in deals tying NDA-K to the Myanmar military as a Border Guard Force since 2009. As a minister in the Kachin State government, he oversees land and natural resources, and is accused of channeling resulting revenues to the military council. He also serves as deputy leader of a committee working with the Chinese company SPINCY to restart the controversial Myitsone–Myitgyi hydropower projects – initiatives long criticized for dispossession, environmental damage, and militarization.
5. U Paung Lunn Min Thang (Zomi National Party, Chin State Amyotha Hluttaw candidate)
   A former Chin State Minister for Social Affairs under the NLD and winner of a 2020 seat with the Zomi Congress for Democracy, Paung Lunn Min Thang is now aligned with the Zomi National Party. He is identified as a leading figure in the Zomi Revolutionary Army–Eastern Command (ZRA-EC), an armed group accused of collaborating with the junta to attack other Chin resistance forces. ZRA-EC functions as the armed wing of the ZPCC and is active in northern Chin State and western Sagaing Region, where conflict and abuses are ongoing.

Together, these figures demonstrate how the 2025 candidate pool includes individuals deeply embedded in repressive security structures, ranging from intelligence networks to proxy militias and resource-extraction deals benefiting the military.

Hardline Nationalists and Ma Ba Tha–Linked Actors

Another group of candidates are drawn from extremist Buddhist nationalist circles, particularly Ma Ba Tha and related organizations, with records of inciting hatred, targeting minorities, and weaponizing “race and religion” laws.

1. Michael Zaw (aka Aung Kyaw Oo) – People’s Party, Mawlamyine Gyun Pyithu Hluttaw candidate
   An extremist nationalist and member of Ma Ba Tha, Michael Zaw previously ran as an NDF candidate in 2020 and is now contesting for the People’s Party. He has a history of pressuring minorities and leading pro-military rallies. He also filed a case against designer Aung Ko Moe, claiming that his outfit at the film academy awards insulted Buddhism and race and religion, leading to a prison sentence for Aung Ko Moe. His actions reflect the weaponization of religious offence laws to silence artistic and critical voices.
2. U Aye Paing (USDP, Yangon Region Amyotha Hluttaw candidate)
   A lawyer and prominent Ma Ba Tha figure, Aye Paing played a leading role in drafting the four “Race and Religion Protection Laws”, widely criticized as tools for discrimination and control. He has been active in the nationwide Thathana Rakita association, teaches legal courses to extremist nationalists, and frequently acts as their defense lawyer. He regularly speaks at National Language Day events, pro-military rallies, and so-called “nationalist justice” ceremonies, reinforcing a narrative that folds religion, ethnicity, and loyalty to the military into one.
3. Kyaw Myo Shwe (National Unity Party of National Races, Chanmyathazi Pyithu Hluttaw candidate)
   A long-time nationalist activist in Mandalay, Kyaw Myo Shwe sued Myanmar Now editor Ko Swe Win for “baseless criticism” of monk U Wirathu. He helped lead a 2017 protest camp calling for the resignation of the NLD government, for which he was charged under Section 505(b) and imprisoned for one and a half years, and he has also faced charges under Section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law. As a close disciple of U Wirathu, he administered Man Mahawtha Damma Monastery and participated in pro-military and Ma Ba Tha activities.
4. Daw Phyo Phyo Thwel (People’s Party, Lewe Township Pyithu Hluttaw candidate)
   She is contesting as a people’s representative from Naypyidaw and serves as Chair of Women’s Affairs at the Naypyidaw level. She is identified as a hard-line Ma Ba Tha loyalist in the capital, reinforcing the movement’s reach into electoral politics and women’s leadership spaces, while still anchored in ultra-nationalist ideology.
5. U Pyae Phyo (People’s Pioneer Party, Mon State Amyotha Hluttaw PR candidate)
   A former monk from Myin Moe Taung Monastery and later an active member of the Mawlamyine YMBA, Pyae Phyo is now described as an informant for the military council. His shift from religious activism to intelligence-style work illustrates how nationalist networks and the junta’s surveillance machinery overlap.
6. Than Zaw (National Development Party for National Interests, Mawlamyine State Hluttaw candidate)
   Formerly a traffic police officer, Than Zaw chairs the National Development Party for National Interests, a renamed version of the National Development Party founded by U Nay Zin Latt. Based in Mon State, the party is fielding 44 candidates – second only to the USDP in the state. Than Zaw is a member of the Myanmar Nationalist Forces Association (Mon State) and leads nationalist mobilization across the state. He publicly donated funds at a ceremony honoring Ma Ba Tha leaders Zwegabin Sayadaw U Kaw Widhaza and U Wirathu when they were granted the Siri Pyanchi title by the military council.
7. Sai Thay Aung (Chair, Tai Lai/Red Shan National Development Party; Mong Hsu Pyithu Hluttaw candidate)
   Chairing the Tai Lai (Red Shan) National Development Party since its founding, Sai Thay Aung has repeatedly run for parliament and now contests again in 2025. At the 21st-Century Panglong Conference, he advocated for official recognition of Shan-Ni as a distinct national race and a Shan-Ni State. While he once denied links with the Shan-Ni Army (SNA), his more recent campaign messages emphasize the creation of armed forces to “defend villages”, contrasting his party’s “political path” with the armed struggles of the PDFs and KIA, which he blames for destruction and fear. This narrative reframes pro-junta armed groups and related actors as protectors while delegitimizing resistance forces.
8. Min Khin Maung Myint (USDP, Zabuthiri Pyithu Hluttaw candidate)
   A USDP Central Executive Committee member and former Deputy Foreign Minister, Labour Minister, and Industry Minister, Min Khin Maung Myint previously won elections in Mingin in 2010 and 2015, but lost to an NLD candidate in 2020 after using religion-based campaigning and facing complaints under the Election Law. For 2025 he has shifted to contesting Zabuthiri Township in Naypyidaw – a constituency known for producing top-tier officials. He has led the formation of Pyu Saw Htee militias, closely linked to Ma Ba Tha, and used religious symbolism, including handing out Buddha images to factory workers in Hlaingthaya, as part of his vote-canvassing strategy.

These nationalist candidates bring with them histories of incitement, legal harassment of critics, and close alignment with the military’s political agenda. Their presence in the race points to the centrality of extremist nationalism in the junta’s electoral strategy.

Patterns and Implications

Across these profiles, several patterns emerge:

1. Impunity for serious allegations: Individuals linked to political assassinations, transnational repression, or collaboration with abusive armed groups are not only free, but being recycled as parliamentary candidates.
2. Weaponization of law and religion: Lawyers and activists associated with Ma Ba Tha have used “race and religion” laws and defamation suits to target journalists, artists, and critics, while claiming to defend Buddhism and national identity.
3. Fusion of security, business, and politics: Figures involved in militia formation, Border Guard Forces, and controversial resource deals occupy key roles in state governments and party leaderships, blurring lines between civil office and military-economic networks.
4. Use of informants and surveillance: Former officers and ex-monks alleged to have acted as informants in prisons or in communities now step into formal politics, bringing with them networks of surveillance and control.

In the context of a “sham election” organized under military rule, the presence of such candidates underscores why many see the 2025 process as an instrument of continuity, not change. Rather than expanding civic space or protecting rights, it risks entrenching the very actors and structures responsible for repression, violence, and the erosion of democratic freedoms in Myanmar.

The profiles information are collected by Burma Monitor.